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Southern employers on enterprise 
bargaining 
Ian McAndrew and Paul Hursthouse * 
With recently proposed amendments to the 1987 Labour Relations Act, the 
Government has moved another step towards embracing enterprise bargaining as a 
cornerstone of future New Zealand labour relations. This paper reports the opinions 
on enterprise bargaining of a sample of 92 employers in Otago and Southland. The 
employers are found to be equally divided in their preferences between enterprise 
bargaining and the award system. However, there is no evidence of widespread 
overt dissatisfaction with the functioning of the award system. 
1 . Introduction 
That the New Zealand labour relations system is in a state of transition is beyond 
dispute. That collective bargaining at the enterprise level will be an increasingly 
prominent feature of the system seems ever more likely. 
The Labour Government has introduced amendments to the 1987 Labour Relations 
Act "to ensure that where there is a desire to move towards enterprise bargaining, and 
where employers and employees arc satisfied that that form of bargaining will benefit 
their interests, enterprise agreements should result'' (Minister of Labour. 1990). This is 
to be accomplished by authorising employers of 50 or more unionised employees to 
initiate enterprise bargaining by invitation to the union(s) or by calling for a vote of their 
employees. At the same time, the 1990 National Party industr~al relations policy clearly 
contemplates decentralising the labour relations structure to the enterprise level and 
beyond (National Party, 1990). 
Both the New Zealand Employers Federation (NZEF) and the New Zealand Business 
Roundtable (NZBR) are on record in support of enterprise bargaining as a central feature 
of New Zealand labour relations (NZEF, 1986; NZBR, 1986). Furthermore, in the 
context of its concept of "industrial democracy", the New Zealand Council of Trade 
Unions (NZCTU) advocates wide-ranging negotiations at enterprise level, though as a 
supplement to, rather than as a substitute for negotiations at higher structural levels 
(NZCTU, 1989). And this notion has found endorsement in the report of the Committee 
of Inquiry into Industrial Democracy (CIID, 1989). In short, there appears to be a certain 
inevitability about the emergence of enterprise bargaining as a major structural feature of 
New Zealand labour relations in the not too distant future. 
Questions linger, however, regarding both the widespread suitability of the concept to 
the New Zealand setting, and the enthusiasm or even reaclincss of unions and employers to 
embrace it. Of particular interest here is the widespread perception that smaller and 
medium-sized New Zealand firms are happy enough with the status quo and decidedly less 
enthused about enterprise bargaining than their larger counterparts (Minister of Labour, 
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1986; Minister of Labour, 1990; Wood, 1988, p.I69; NZCTU, 1989, p.12). Major 
employer organisations disapprovingly share this perception. The NZEF pleads with 
employers to think about the issues and study the options (Marshall, 1989). The NZBR, 
with a narrower membership eager for change, is less patient. 
A recent NZBR document somewhat testily captured that organisation's perception of 
employer complacency, while suggesting hopefully that the number of employers 
resistant to labour relations change was "probably diminishing". Those still trailing the 
play were portrayed as unwilling to give more attention to employee relations; as "not 
well placed to compete in the marketplace"; and as smugly insulated from competitive 
pressures. Some were seen as using award rates to avoid paying higher rates within the 
firm's capacity to pay, while at the other ex treme, it was suggested that some larger 
employers used across-the-board award increases to push out smaller and more marginal 
competitors (NZBR, 1989, pp.ll-12). 
This rather uncharitable view portrays the recalcitrant employers as little more than 
warts on the societal bottom, selfishly clingi ng to the old ways, thwarting the march of 
progress. Yet the widespread perception persists that enterprise bargaining is a creation 
by and for the "New Right"; that most New Zealand employers, beyond a handful of 
corporate giants such as those represented by the Business Roundtable, arc not 
enthusiastic about enterprise bargainmg because it would do nothing for them; and that 
many arc of such a size that they could not handle it even if cleansed of their alleged sins. 
As with all good things in the social sciences, the truth inevitably lies somewhere 
between these extremes. 
Small and medium-sized firms arc the basis of much New Zealand industry and 
employment, and their views on bargaining structural reform are important for the future 
of New Zealand labour relations. While often speculated about and sometimes maligned, 
those views have been rarely documented or articulated as the waves of legislative reform 
have rolled on by. 
Earlier research by one of the authors (McAndrew, 1989) reported employer attitudes 
on bargruning scope and touched on their views on bargaining structure, particularly as 
they related to scope. That earlier study, based on a postal survey, found some limited 
encouragement for advocates of enterprise bargaining. Its principal finding, in terms of 
employer views on bargaining structure, however, was that there was a need for further 
documentation of those views, their pallcrns, and their bases. The follow-up research 
reponed in the present paper is intended to begin to address that need. 
2. Study design and sample 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with representatives of 92 firms in Otago 
and Southland. The sample was derived from earlier research, and was constructed as 
follows. A 1988 postal survey was mailed to the 4 76 member employers of the Otago-
Southland Employers Association then employing between 10 and 100 staff. Of these, 
222 valid responses were received. Of those 222 employers, 117 indicated in their mailed 
responses that they were prepared to participate in a follow-up interview. Of the 117, all 
7 local public agencies had been absorbed by restructuring subsequent to the postal 
survey, 10 firms had ceased business, and 8 firms declined to participate in the interview 
progmmmc. 
The interviews, conducted between January, 1989 and March, 1990, averaged about 
one hour. Those interviewed were all senior managers, with nearly 90 percent being 
either owners, part owners, or chief exec uti vc officers. Almost 60 percent of the firms 
operated just a single place of business, and the sample was evenly split between the. 
main centre of Dunedin and elsewhere in the region. 
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In terms of "the main business'' of the respondent finns and the n1ajor divisions of 
the New Zealand Standard Enterprise Industry Classification (NZEIC) of the New Zealand 
Department of Statistics, 14 of the 92 \vere in Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and 
Fishing, 2 were in Mining and Quarrying, 20 were in Manufacturing, 14 were in Building 
and Construction, 22 were in Wholesale and Retail Trade and Restaurants and Hotels, 9 
\Vere in Transport, Storage and Communication, 1 was in Finaucing, Insurance, ReaJ 
Estate and Business Services, and 10 were in Community, Social and Personal Services. 
All participating organisations were private sector firms. 
3. Labour relations profile 
The vast majority of the 'A'Orkcrs employed by firms in this study were covered by a 
union negotiated document. About a third of the firms had 90 percent of their employees 
covered, while more than half had between 70 and 90 percent of their en1ployecs under a 
union document. Workers in three-quarters of the firms were covered exclusively by 
national occupational awards. Less than 10 percent of the firms had experience with an 
enterprise agreement. The employers were dealing with an average of 3 unions. In over 
two-thirds of cases, the principal union on site, defined as the union representing the 
largest number of employees, represented 70 percent or more of the unioniscd employees, 
thereby providing a substantial base for either enterprise or industrial bargaining structures 
in those firms. 
This picture of apparent union penetration \vas not matched by the reported contact 
respondents had wil.h unions. In the 12 monl.hs prior to being interviewed, a third of the 
employers had not deall with l.he principal union at all, while another third had deall \~lith 
the union just once or twice. The other third had dealt with the union more often. Union 
contacts mostly concerned issues of award interpretation, disn1issals, or the negotiation of 
single issues, such as redundancy, or arose out of a general union request to meet with the 
workforce. Four out of 5 of these employers transacted any business with the union 
through paid union officials. Only about 20 percent dealt with a shop floor delegate; 
most of the rest were una'A'are of any union delegates amongst their workforces. 
One-fourth of the em p toyers bel ievcd that the union did a good job for its 
membership. Nlost of the rest had a predominantly, if mildly, negative view, more often 
based on the perception that the union did too little too timidly, rather than too much too 
aggressively. Close to one-third felt that the union simply didn't do anything. 
This profile is not one of employers blocked at every turn by troublesome unions. 
Indeed, these employers were largely doing their own thing on employee relations 
mauers, essentially unmolested by unions except perhaps at the rare critical point where 
someone lost their job for one reason or another. 
For example, 85 percent paid above award rates to some or all employees some or all 
of t.he time. Most of these fixed the rates unilaterally. About one-third volunteered that 
they paid above the awards to counter effects of the current labour relations system, that is 
to equalise certain employment terms across awards or to accomn1odate those employees 
whose unions hadn't settled their awards as expeditiously as the unions representing other 
ernployecs of the f trm. 
~1ost of the employers in the sample, then, were seLLing their O\vn pay structures and, 
while pay levels generally moved with award increases, Lhe employers unilaterally set the 
relationship between actual rates and award rates. In many instances, they also varied that 
relationship, for example by raising the level of the entire above award pay structure 
according to the negotiated increase in the award covering the largest number of their 
employees. \Vhile these above award practices arc not inconsistent \vith the notion of 
awards as minimum documents, it must be said that they dirninish the degree to which 
employees perceive their union to be responsible for the dollars in their pay packets. 
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awards as minimum documents, it must be said that they diminish the degree to which 
employees perceive their union to be responsible for the dollars in their pay packets. 
Not surprisingly, then, nearly 90 percent of the respondents indicated that they had 
been "usually satisfied" with the wage increases negotiated "in award negotiations over the 
past five years". Generally, award wages were seen as consistent with cost-of-living 
increases, as well as being in line with those negotiated in other awards, and within the 
finn 's ability to pay. In the only widespread point of dissatisfaction, about one-third of 
the employers in the sample complained of extra payments, such as penalty rates and 
allowances, which were most often seen as irrelevant to the region and as serving the 
needs of either unions or employers in other regions, particularly Auckland. Only four 
employers expressed dissatisfaction with "the process of award negotiations". 
Beyond wage issues, the survey revealed no union involvement, by way of either on-
the-spot input or a previously negotiated document in over 90 percent of the firm s on 
safety issues, or on the assignment of overtime opportunities (other than some 
protections against compulsion), or on more strategic questions of introducing new 
technology or otherwise changing the work process. 
Union involve1nent aside, there was little evidence either of employee consultation 
practices that would be recognised by advocates of "industrial democracy" as affording 
employees substantial input into decision making. This is stated as a fact, rather than as 
a criticism. The sample firm s abounded with occasions for casual contact between 
employees and managers. It is inherently difficult, however, to evaluate these interactions 
in terms of either the quality or quantity of opportunities they presented for employee 
input or control of managerial decisions. Suffice it to say that there were few frrms in the 
sample in which there were any formal employee constraints on managerial decision 
making. 
In broad summary, these employers found neither unions nor the labour relations 
sys tem particularly burdensome. They enjoyed wide latitude in directing their employees 
and conducting employee relations matters day-to-day, restrained only by minimum 
standards of pay in award documenL<; and broad behavioural parameters defined by 
predominantly legislative restrictions on employee dismissal, employee endangerment, 
and so on. In essence, the existing sys tem did not appear to restrict them overly. 
4. Enterprise bargaining 
The central purpose of the interviews was to elici t the opinions of employers on 
enterprise bargaining: its advantages, its disadvantages, and how they perceived that it 
might work. 
The system defined 
A possible sys tem of enterprise bargaining was conceptualised to a1l interviewed 
employers as follows: 
(1) there would be a single union representing the entire unionised workforce of your 
company; 
(2) the union representing your employees would be affiliated with a national union; 
(3) the union and your fim1 would negotiate an agreement covering only the employees 
of your company; 
(4) your workforce would be represented in these negotiations by a union official as 
advocate and adviser along with a small team of your employees selected by the 
workforce to speak for them; 
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(5) your finn would be represented in these negotiations by yourself and/or other 
management staff, with or without the assistance of an advocate (from the 
employers association for example) at your discretion; and 
(6) the terms of the agreement reached (the subject matter covered, the period of time 
covered, and the details of settlement on wages and other matters) would be as 
agreed between the parties, and again, would be applicable to only your finn and its 
employees. No other award or agreement would be applicable to your finn or its 
employees. 
Regardless of their current arrangements, employers were asked to react to this 
particular concept of enterprise bargaining, assuming that it "was implemented (by a 
change in the law, for example), with all other factors (such as the right to strike, the 
personal grievance procedure, the level of union coverage and so on) remaining as they are 
today". The first questions concerned the possible use of an outside advocate. 
Almost two-thirds of the firms indicated that they would usc an outside advocate to 
assist in negotiations at the enterprise level. An outside advocate was seen as providing 
needed expertise in both the process and the issues, as well as providing a link to 
developments in other companies. Only eight respondents specifically mentioned the 
involvement of a union advocate as a basis for using an advocate themselves, although 
this might well have been a consideration in the widespread perceived need for expertise. 
A little over one-third of the firms said that they would be inclined to handle the 
negotiations themselves, citing their better knowledge of the company and existing good 
relations with their staff. 
5. Enterprise bargaining versus the national a\vard system 
Interviewees were asked whether they saw "any advantages to your finn" in the 
enterprise bargaining system described "over the national award system". Perceived 
advantages seen by 10 or more of the employers are reported in Table 1. 
Table 1: Number of errzployers perceiving advantages of enterprise bargaining (n=92) 
Perceived advantages Employers 
No advantages over national occupational bargaining system 33 
Generate employment terms more tailored to local circumstances 46 
Promote beuer management-staff working relationships 19 
Allow greater company input into the bargaining process 18 
Standardise employment terms across company workforce 14 
Allow greater input into the bargaining process by the company's employees 13 
Responses to this and like questions were open-ended and categorised subsequently. It 
is perhaps worth noting that the figures reported represent the number of interviewees 
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volunteering the response, rather than the number who might concur with the responses if 
placed before them for reaction. 
Interviewees were also asked whether they saw any disadvantages for the firm in the 
enterprise system versus the national award system. Disadvantages seen by 10 or more 
employers arc reported in Table 2. 
Table 2: Number of employers perceiving disadvantages of enterprise bargaining (n=92) 
Perceived disadvantages Employers 
No disadvantages by comparison with national occupational bargaining system 12 
Would damage management-staff working relationships 21 
Would require additional managerial costs, duties and lime 20 
Would isolate the company from other employers 19 
Would result in an absence of pay guidelines for company pay setting 18 
Would increase the pro\pcct of the company being targeted by the union 18 
Would generate greater labour consciousness among the workforce 11 
Having offered their opinions on the advantages and disadvantages of enterprise 
bargaining, interviewees were asked whether, "on balance", they felt that the enterprise 
system would be "beuer for your firm than the national award sys tem, or not as good". 
The sample was almost evenly divided, with 48 employers preferring en terprise 
bargainmg and 44 opting for the national award system. Of the 92 employers, 53 felt 
that enterpnse bargaining would be better for their employees than the national award 
system. 
6 . Patterns of preference 
Chi-square tests were conducted to identify any relationships between employer 
preference on bargaming structure and the characteristics of the sample firms. There was 
no statistically significant relationship between interviewee status and preference. 
Of the non-labour relations characteristics, only the nature of the business bore any 
stalistlcally significant relationship to preference for enterprise bargaining. There was no 
preference patLem associated with either the firm's number of places of business, or 
location wtthin the Otago-Southland area. 
Employers 1n the Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing category of the NZEIC 
were significantly more likely, while employers in the Wholesale and Retail Trade and 
Restaurants and Hotels category were significantly less likely to prefer enterprise 
bargaining than the remaining employers in the sample (p<.003). 
There was no staltstically signtficant corrclalion between preference for enterprise 
bargaining and the number of uniontsed employees in the firm. Indeed, perhaps 
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unexpectedly, 60 percent of those with 25 or less unionised employees favoured enterprise 
bargaining, compared with only about 40 percent of those with more than 25 unionised 
employees. This result suggests that the Government's recently introduced legislation 
extending the right to initiate enterprise bargaining to only those employers with 50 or 
more unionised employees ought perhaps to be rethought 
7. Union representation and relations 
There was a weak but statistically significant relationship between preference for 
enterprise bargaining and the percentage of a firm's employees covered by union 
negotiated documents. Specifically, employers with less than 85 percent of their 
employees covered were more likely to prefer enterprise bargaining than those with 85 
percent or more of their employees under union jurisdiction (p<.03). 
There were no statistically significant relationships between preference for enterprise 
bargaining and the number of unions currently in the plant, or the principal union with 
which the firm dealt, or the percentage of unionised employees represented by the 
principal union, or whether the principal union representative was a paid official or a shop 
floor delegate. There were, however, some interesting and suggestive numbers in several 
of these respects. 
For example, isolating the three unions that were the principal union in I 0 percent or 
more of the sample establishments, preference for enterprise bargaining was expressed by 
60 percent of employers dealing principally with the Drivers Union, by almost 70 percent 
of employers dealing principally with the Engineers Union, by only about 20 percent of 
those dealing principally with the Shop Employees Union, and by about half of the 
remaining employers dealing principally with one of the other 27 unions that showed up 
in the sample. 
Or again, while not statistically significant, it is of interest that almost three-quarters 
of employers who dealt primarily with a shop floor union delegate preferred enterprise 
bargaining, whereas less than one-half of those dealing primarily with a paid union 
official did so. Similarly, a higher percentage of those etnployers who dealt regularly 
with the principal union preferred enterprise bargaining than was the case among 
employers who seldom or never had contact with the union. Those dealing regularly with 
unions were also more likely to view the union positively (p<.03), as were those dealing 
with a shop floor delegate (p<.005). As will be discussed later, these ostensible 
relationships appear to be derived from more primary ones. 
8. Award coverage and involvement 
There were no patterns of preference for enterprise bargaining associated with 
expressed satisfaction or dissatisfaction with either award wage increases over the 
preceding five years or the perceived opportunities for input and involvement in the award 
process. But one factor that did prove to be significant in relation to employer preference 
for enterprise bargaining was the current pattern of award and/or agreement coverage. 
Those employers whose unioniscd employees were covered exclusively by national or 
ncar-national awards were significantly less likely to prefer enterprise bargaining than 
those whose employees were covered exclusively by regional awards, exclusively by plant 
agreements, or by some combination of documents that included regional awards and/or 
plant agreements (p<.02). Those employers with some or all <;mployees currently under 
an enterprise agreement were significantly more likely to prefer enterprise bargaining 
(p<.005). Indeed, all of the employers with a plant agreement covering some or all 
employees expressed a preference for enterprise bargaining over the national award system. 
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9. Current decision-making practices 
There were no statistically significant relationships found between preference for 
enterprise bargaining and current decision-making practices. For example, employers 
presently paying above award rates were no more likely to prefer enterprise bargaining 
than those paying the award rates. Further, while some of the reasons cited for paying 
above award rates, such as the equalisation of terms across the workforce, suggested an 
enterprise approach, they were not reliable predictors of preference. Likewise, there was 
no relationship between bargaining structure preference and the manner in which above 
award payments were determined. As a minor, but perhaps noteworthy exception, each of 
the small number of employers who had fixed above award rates through informal second 
tier union negotiations preferred enterprise bargaining over the national award system. 
In a similar pattern, close to 90 percent of those employers who indicated that they 
would presently mvolve the union in resolving safety concerns preferred enterprise 
bargaining, compared with less than half of those who would not involve the union. Or 
again, each of the small number of employers who indicated that they would negotiate 
with the union(s) over the decision to introduce new technology or otherwise change the 
production process expressed a preference for enterprise bargaining. Beyond these 
footnotes, however, there were no relationships between bargaining structure preference 
and current deciston makmg procedures. 
1 0. Characteristics of enterprise bargaining 
As might be expected, there was a certain cohesion evident in the responses to the 
several questions directly focused on enterprise bargaining. For example, those preferring 
enterpnse bargaining were significantly less likely to want to use an outside advocate to 
assist in the bargaining (p<.007). Half of those opting for enterprise bargaining would 
use an advocate at that level, whereas three-quarters of those preferring the national award 
system would usc an advocate if they were required to negotiate at enterprise level. 
Employers preferring enterprise bargaining over the national award system were very 
much more likely to believe that enterprise bargaining would also be better for thetr 
employees than those prefernng the national award system (p<.OOOO I). 
Higher percentages of those ciung improved productivity (100 percent), better union 
understanding (I 00 percent, better staff relations (94. 7 percent), and terms tailored to the 
needs of the company (82.6 percent) as perceived advantages of enterprise bargaining 
preferred that system "on balance" than was the case among those citing other, 
presumably less persuasive advantages. On the other side of the ledger, higher 
percentages of those who cited a reduction in informal managerial discretion (IOO percent), 
higher labour consciousness (90.9 percent) or union presence in the plant (85.7 percent), 
demands on management time (84.2 percent), and potential damage to staff relations (81.0 
percent as perceived disadvantages of enterprise bargaining opted for the national award 
sys tem than was the case among those seeing other disadvantages in a sys tem of 
enterprise agreements. 
Finally, there was no relationship between an employer's preference for enterprise 
bargaining and the wtllingness to negotiate either safety rules or overtime assignment 
rules at cntcrpnse level. In other words, employers preferring the national award systc1n 
were as willing as employers prefcrnng the enterprise system to negotiate these issues at 
enterprise level, in the event an enterprise bargaining system was implemented. 
Enterprise bargaining 125 
11. Discussion 
A small majority of the employers in the sample indicated that they would opt for an 
enterprise bargaining system and out of the national award system if given the 
opportunity. Their reasons for doing so, however, would appear to be based on 
something other than a groundswell of discontent with the existing system. The survey 
data reveal little overt dissatisfaction with existing patterns of interaction between 
employers and unions, and relatively little dissatisfaction with the outcomes of the 
existing system. 
Few of these employers have any complaints about the award negotiations process. 
Most expressed the view that the opportunities to be involved are there if they choose to 
take them. Additionally, no statistically significant relationships were found between 
preference for enterprise bargaining and any of the union variables. While some of these 
employers find the union irritating, most simply do not see unions as threatening or 
unduly restrictive. Finally in terms of processes, there was no relationship between 
preference for enterprise bargaining and current decision making practices. In short, there 
is no evidence that a negative reaction to the way in which employers and unions interact 
in the current system is motivating the preference for enterprise bargaining by more than 
half the employers in the sample. 
With one exception, there is no evidence to suggest that active dissatisfaction with 
the outcomes produced by the existing system arc motivators for a change to enterprise 
bargaining either. Nine out of 10 of the employers have no complaints with the base 
wage increases generated by the award negotiation process. The NZBR may be close to 
the mark in saying that employers sec the award system "delivering ... relativcly low 
increases in nominal wages" . However, in leaping from that observation to the 
suggestion that paying low award wages is a substantial basis for employer preference for 
national awards, the Business Roundtable's analysis strays from the mark. 
To begin with, those few employers who do have complaints about the award wage 
increa~s show no greater inclination toward enterprise bargaining than the rest. Beyond 
that, the great majority of employers in the sample pay above the awards. Yet there was 
no relationship between preference for enterprise bargaining and current above award pay 
practices. 
In short, base wages do not seem to be the issue. Many of these employers do not 
see unions as being as influential in wage setting as labour market and performance 
factors. Presumably, those opting for enterprise bargaining anticipate that unions 
negotiating at that level, with greater understanding of the company's circumstances, 
would be unlikely to push wages above levels dictated by these factors and the firm's 
ability to pay. One factor that did arise consistently in interviews as a point of discontent 
was that of compensation beyond base wages - penalty rates and industry allowances. 
About one-third of the employers expressed concerns in these areas. There was, however, 
no statistically significant relationship between this type of concern and preference for 
enterprise bargaining. 
Motivators for change 
If not discontent with the existing system, what then motivates half of the employers 
in the sample to opt for enterprise bargaining? IL should be noted, incidentally, that the 
enterprise bargaining model described was not the "ideal" one from an employer's point of 
view. For example, it was specified that the union representing the firm's employees 
would be affiliated with a national union, and that the union would dispatch an advocate 
to represent the firm's employees in negotiations. Additionally, no fallback position was 
offered, no opportunity to opt back into a national award if things didn't work out as 
126 McAndrew and Hursthouse 
expected locally. Nonetheless, more than half opted for the enterprise system, and not 
because of widespread active disaffection with the national award system. Why then? 
Two-thirds of the employers in the sample saw one or more advantages to their firm 
in moving to enterprise bargaining. The most commonly seen advantage was the ability 
to fashion employment terms tailored to the needs of the company. Among the other 
most commonly mentioned advantages were the related ones of greater company input 
into the bargaining process and control over bargaining outcomes, and greater input by 
the fum's employees into the bargaining process, presumably guiding positions taken on 
the union side of the bargaining table in a direction more in tune with company 
circumstances. Other perceived advantages mentioned most frequently were the 
opportunities for the development of closer working relationships between management 
and employees, and the standardisation of employment terms across the workforce. 
There is a certain cohesion to the major advantages ci ted for enterprise bargaining, and 
it is supported by the strong statistical relationship between preference for enterprise 
bargaining and the belief that enterprise bargaining would also be advantageous for the 
firm's employees. The most persuasive advantages seen for enterprise bargaining were 
improved productivity, better union understanding of the company's needs and 
circumstances, better management-staff relations and cooperation, and employment terms 
tailored to company circumstances. It will be recalled that more than 80 percent of 
employers citing any of these advantages opted for enterprise bargaining over the national 
award system. 
In essence, to col lectively paraphrase those employers opting for the enterprise 
bargaining system, that system is seen as providing greater input into the bargaining 
process by both the employer and the firm's employees, thereby generating opportunities 
for a cooperative approach as well as employment terms tailored to the needs and 
circumstances of the parties, in tum resulting in productivity gains. Economically, pay 
supplements seen as counter-producti vc and irrelevant to the firm's circumstances may go, 
but the lowering of base pay rates docs not appear to be a target. The enterprise 
bargaining system is seen by those employers who would prefer it as offering a positive 
contribution to the firm's and the employees' prosperity. These employers see the award 
system, by contrast, as neither contributing, nor particularly detracting, at least overtly, 
from the finn's performance. 
On the other side of the coin, most of the employers in the sample saw one or more 
disadvantages to enterprise bargaining by comparison with the national award system. 
Most often mentioned were the potential damage to management-staff relations, the 
increased administrative workload and time commiunent required for the labour relations 
function, isolation from the rest of the indu~try, the absence of pay guidelines, and the 
potential for targeting of companies by unions. Each of these disadvantages was 
mentioned by about 20 percent of the sample. Smaller numbers mentioned, in a variety 
of other waysl the intrusion of labour relations into the plant. Some of the motivations 
suggested by the NZBR analysis arc apparent in this list, though the cynical tone of that 
analysis represents only one possible appraisal of these motivations. The most 
persuasive disadvantages seen in enterprise bargaining were the loss of informal 
managerial discretion, a higher degree of labour consciousness amongst the workforce, a 
greater union presence in the plant, greater demands on management time, and the 
potential damage to staff relations. 
To again collectively paraphrase the thinking of those employers preferring to stay 
with the national award system, enterprise bargaining is seen as raising the profile and 
consciousness of labour relations in the workplace, distracting both managers and 
employees from their principal purpose in being together in the first place, drunaging the 
existing camaraderie, and isolating the company from the rest of the industry and the 
labour market. In essence, the enterprise system is seen as more divisive. demanding and 
intrusive without sufficient concomit.ant benefits, whereas the national award system is 
seen as non-intrusive, non-demanding, and a buffer against divisiveness in the plant over 
Enterprise bargaining 127 
labour relations matters. The fact that employers with a high percentage of workers 
unionised were more inclined to prefer the national award system seems consistent with 
their fear that a "them versus us" attitude would be likely to result from enterprise 
bargaining. 
It is noteworthy that employers in the agricultural processing and related category, 
including fish processing and timber, were more likely to prefer enterprise bargaining than 
other employers, and that etnployers in the retailing and related category, most of whom 
were retailers, were less likely to prefer enterprise bargaining than other employers. 
Two factors seem to oc at work here. Firms in the agriculture and related category are 
amongst the most export oriented New Zealand finns, while the retail and related category 
would be amongst the NZEIC categories least exposed to the pressures of global 
competition, or in the words of the NZBR document, "still operating in protected 
markets". Second, firms in the agriculture and related category not only have the widest 
experience with plant agreements, but also have wide experience with regional awards. 
Those firms in the sample with experience under either form of localised document were 
significantly more likely to opt for enterprise bargaining. Likewise, those firms that 
reported presently involving unions in a range of decision making were more likely to opt 
for enterprise bargaining. 
Exposure to external competitive pressures and exposure to local negotiations, then, 
appear to be two factors positively related to preference for enterprise bargaining. And of 
course, there may be an historical causal relationship between these two factors, in which 
case some might be tempted to argue that those most in need of decentralised 
arrangements can get them under existing legislation. 
Finally, it is noteworthy that two-thirds of the employers in the sample would opt to 
use an outside advocate in enterprise bargaining from the outset. An additional one-
quarter were prepared to bring an advocate into the negotiations if necessary, though not 
initially. 
A total of over 85 percent, then, were ready to usc an outside advocate to represent 
them in negotiations. This perception of the way in which enterprise bargaining would 
work is clearly not the whimsical holding of hands contemplated by disciples of the 
unitarist school of labour relations. Rather, at least for those preferring enterprise 
bargaining, it is a pluralist approach to employer-employee cooperation within the 
framework of the inherently plun1list process of enterprise bargaining. For those opposed 
to a move to enterprise bargaining, the usc of an advocate is a practical defensive measure, 
as pragmatically grounded as their opposition to enterprise bargaining. 
The underlying theme here is, in fact, pragmatism. The en1ployers in the sample 
divided about evenly on whether enterprise bargaining would be advantageous to their 
firms or disadvantageous, by comparison with the national award system. Half thought 
they saw positive opportunities; half saw any benefits outweighed by the intrusions 
inherent in the enterprise system. In both cases, those views appear to be pragmatic 
decisions based on their experiences and circurnstanccs. 
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